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OF ALL THE GIN JOINTS: HARRIS 
AND THE SUPREME COURT’S 
RELUCTANT JURISPRUDENCE ON 
PARTISANSHIP IN REDISTRICTING 
ANDREW BELLIS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Rick: How can you close me up? On what grounds?  
Captain Renault: I’m shocked . . . shocked to find that gambling is 
going on in there.  
Croupier: Your winnings sir.  
Captain Renault: [sotto voce] Oh, thank you very much.1 
The Supreme Court has shown great reluctance to expand its 
jurisprudence on partisanship in redistricting. Like Renault’s attitude 
towards gambling, the Supreme Court has consistently allowed 
partisanship to influence the legislative redistricting process, 
condemning it only when it is forced into the light because it has gone 
“too far.”2 
As a result, courts have had a difficult time discerning the 
motivations for drawing legislative maps.3 If a change has the effect of 
furthering a legitimate state policy while also promoting a partisan 
end, the Court has given little guidance on how to proceed. To further 
complicate the matter, the Supreme Court has consistently held that 
compliance with the Voting Rights Act4 is a legitimate state rationale,5 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017. Andrew wishes to thank 
Professor Guy-Uriel Charles and J. Gerald Hebert for their support in the writing of this article. 
He would also like to thank his father, Peter Bellis, for helping him use films to explore and 
explain even the most abstract of topics. 
 1.  CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942). 
 2.  See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting most Justices 
believed partisanship “is a traditional criterion, and a constitutional one, so long as it does not 
go too far”). 
 3.  See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (rejecting 
a political gerrymandering claim). 
 4.  Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. 
 5.  See, e.g., Abrams v Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 
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but recently invalidated the coverage formula under Section 4(b) of 
the Act, freeing all covered states (including Arizona) from the 
requirement to seek preclearance for all new legislative maps.6 
Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission7 turns on 
two questions: First, if partisanship can justify population deviations 
from the Equal Protection Clause’s one-person, one-vote standard;8 
and second, if attempting to obtain preclearance9 from the 
Department of Justice is a valid justification for population deviations, 
even after Shelby County v. Holder. 
This Commentary will detail the facts of the case and describe the 
current state of the law on partisanship and preclearance as 
justifications for population deviations. Next, it will outline the three-
judge panel’s holding. Then, it will sketch out each party’s arguments 
regarding the two issues on appeal. Finally, it will analyze the 
competing arguments and conclude that the Supreme Court should 
affirm the lower court, holding that although neither partisanship nor 
preclearance are acceptable justifications for population deviations, 
the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission’s final map did 
not contain sizeable enough deviations to establishing a prima facie 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC) is a 
commission created by a 2000 state ballot initiative to design new 
maps for state legislative districts based on the federal census every 
ten years.10 AIRC is comprised of five individuals: two Democrats 
chosen by Democratic leadership in the state house and state senate 
respectively, two Republicans chosen by Republican leadership in the 
 
(1996). 
 6.  Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2015). 
 7.  14-232 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2015). 
 8.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 254–55 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (explaining that a 
wide disparity in voting strength between large and small counties within a state will give rise to 
an equal protection claim.) 
 9.  Preclearance is a process in which states submit proposed voting changes to the 
Department of Justice in order to gain assurance that the changes will not trigger subsequent 
litigation from the federal government. 
 10.  Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050–51 (D. Ariz. 
2014) (per curiam), prob. juris. noted, 135 S. Ct. 2926 (2015). 
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state house and state senate respectively, and one Independent 
selected to chair the commission by the other four members.11 
After the 2010 census, AIRC began its required mapping process 
by creating “districts of equal population in a grid-like pattern across 
the state.”12 AIRC ultimately voted to adopt a grid map beginning in 
the southeast corner of the state and moving inwards in a clockwise 
fashion with a maximum population deviation13 of 4.07 percent.14 
AIRC then began to adjust the map to “comply with the United 
States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act” per state 
constitutional directive.15 AIRC also took into account five other 
factors required by the Arizona Constitution: “(1) equality of 
population between districts; (2) geographic compactness and 
contiguity; (3) respect for communities of interest; (4) respect for 
visible geographic features, city, town and county boundaries, and 
undivided census tracts; and (5) competitiveness.”16 Until this point, 
AIRC appeared to be largely unified in its map considerations, but 
one key question threatened to disrupt the entire process: How many 
benchmark districts existed in the previous map?17 
The total number of benchmark districts represents the number of 
districts where minorities are able to elect a candidate of their 
choosing.18 A potential redistricting map has an impermissible effect 
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act if it “would lead to a 
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their 
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”19 In practice, the new 
redistricting plan cannot create fewer districts in which minorities 
have the ability to elect candidates of their choosing.20 At the time of 
AIRC’s work, all potential new maps made by the commission were 
subject to preclearance by the Department of Justice to ensure no 
retrogression would take place.21 
 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 1053 (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)). 
 13. Population deviation is the difference between the most populated district and the least 
populated district divided by the average population of a district. 
 14.  Harris, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 1053. Typically, any deviation less than 10% is considered 
acceptable. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (2014). 
 15.  Id. at 1055 (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)). 
 16.  Id. (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)). 
 17.  Id. at 1056–57. 
 18.  Id. at 1053–54. 
 19.  Id. at 1054 (quoting Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 478 (1997)). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 1055. 
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For AIRC, there was disagreement over exactly how many 
benchmark districts existed in the old map.22 In an initial presentation 
to AIRC before it began adjusting the grid map, Bruce Adelson, the 
commission’s mapping and Voting Rights Act consultant, stated that 
he had found nine benchmark districts in the 2002 map.23 However, 
AIRC soon began contemplating the existence of ten benchmark 
districts based on the fact that a few districts where minorities did not 
make up a majority of the population were still consistently able to 
elect minority candidates.24 Uncertain of how many benchmark 
districts the Department of Justice would find in its review of the new 
plan, AIRC followed the advice of counsel, opting to go the safe route 
and include ten benchmark districts—seven minority-majority 
districts and another three ability-to-elect districts.25 This rough draft 
was then approved by a 4-1 vote.26 
After the vote, AIRC continued to take advice from its attorneys 
and consultants as to whether or not ten benchmark districts was the 
proper total.27 AIRC received a draft racial polarization voting 
analysis prepared by hired experts, confirming that minorities would 
be able to elect candidates of their choice in all ten proposed 
benchmark districts.28 “The Commission also received advice [from 
Adelson] that it could use population shifts, within certain limits, to 
strengthen [benchmark] districts,” and that such a course of action 
would be “prudent” given the uncertainty regarding the Department 
of Justice’s preclearance procedures.29 
AIRC ultimately adopted changes to Districts 24 and 26 aimed at 
increasing the minority populations’ ability to elect in each district.30 
Shortly after the adoption, however, the Commission also began to 
consider changes to Districts 8 and 11.31 While Adelson felt that AIRC 
could turn District 8 into another ability-to-elect district if it nudged 
the minority population up slightly, the two Republican 
Commissioners worried that the change would result in 
 
 22.  Id. at 1057. 
 23.  Id. at 1056. 
 24.  Id. at 1057. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 1058. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 1059. 
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“hyperpacking” Republican voters into District 11 to favor 
Democratic voters in District 8.32 A Democratic Commissioner noted 
that making districts more competitive was one of the five criteria set 
for AIRC to consider and expressed support because the change 
would make District 8 more competitive.33 AIRC ultimately voted 3-2 
to implement the changes to Districts 8 and 11—the only set of 
changes to the draft map that resulted in a split vote.34 
In early 2012, AIRC voted 3-2 to approve the final legislative map 
with both Republican Commissioners voting against it.35 The 
maximum population deviation of the final map was 8.8%.36 The map 
was submitted to the Department of Justice for preclearance and 
received approval shortly thereafter.37 
Appellants sought an injunction against the map, a declaration 
that the final legislative map violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and a mandate that AIRC draw a new 
map for all elections after 2012.38 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), a 
three-judge panel was convened.39 After deciding several pre-trial 
motions, including dismissing a state law claim and dismissing the 
Commissioners from the suit in their individual capacities, the three-
judge panel presided over a five day bench trial.40 
The panel ultimately held that Appellants had the burden of proof 
to show that the deviations from district to district did not result from 
the implementation of legitimate redistricting policies and that 
Appellants had failed to meet their burden.41 The panel determined 
that because the deviations in population amounted to less than 10%, 
Appellants lacked the requisite facts to show “a prima facie case of a 
one-person, one-vote violation” and shift the burden onto the state.42 
The panel also concluded that Appellants failed to show that the 
illegitimate criteria, in this case partisan political motivations, 
predominated over other legitimate criteria.43 Finally, the panel held 
 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 1060. 
 36.  Id. at 1049. 
 37.  Id. at 1060. 
 38.  Id. at 1048. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 1072–73. 
 42.  Id. at 1071–72. 
 43.  Id. at 1073. 
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that seeking preclearance under the Voting Rights Act is a legitimate 
and rational goal in the redistricting process.44 
Appellants appealed the three-judge panel’s decision to the 
Supreme Court.45 There, the Court noted jurisdiction of the case for 
two questions46: “Does the desire to gain partisan advantage for one 
political party justify creating legislative districts of unequal 
population that deviate from the one-person, one-vote principle of 
the Equal Protection Clause?” and “Does the desire to obtain 
favorable preclearance review by the Justice Department permit the 
creation of legislative districts that deviate from the one-person, one-
vote principle,” even after Shelby County v. Holder?47 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Partisan Redistricting 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the drawing of 
legislative districts which dilute the voting power of citizens of certain 
districts is justiciable48 and prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.49 Although a population deviation is 
permitted if it is based on “legitimate considerations incident to the 
effectuation of rational state policy,”50 the state must justify that 
deviation if the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case.51 Minor 
population deviations, however, are insufficient to establish a prima 
facie case,52 and a “plan with a maximum population deviation under 
10% [generally] falls within this category of minor deviations.”53 This 
does not mean that deviation under 10% shields the state from 
liability; rather, it keeps the burden on the plaintiff to establish that 
illegitimate criteria predominated the state’s considerations.54 
 
 44.  Id. at 1074. 
 45.  Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 
No. 14-232 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2014). 
 46.  Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2946 (2015). 
 47.  Brief for Appellants at i, Harris (U.S. Sept. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants]. 
 48.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962). 
 49.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964) (“The Equal Protection Clause 
demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all 
places as well as of all races.”). 
 50.  Id. at 579. 
 51.  Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (2014). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See, e.g., Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004) (summarily affirming the invalidation of a 
map with 9.98% maximum population deviation). 
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Although it had touched on the question in previous decisions, the 
Supreme Court first analyzed the justiciability of partisan 
justifications for population deviation in Davis v. Bandemer.55 There, 
Indiana Democrats challenged a redistricting map that led to only 43 
Democrats winning seats out of 100 available in the Indiana House of 
Representatives despite Democrats garnering 51.9% of the vote in all 
house races.56 The Court ultimately determined that, based on its 
precedents with other types of constituencies including racial 
gerrymandering cases, such claims are in fact justiciable.57 But beyond 
that, the Court was unable to determine a standard for prima facie 
cases of partisan gerrymandering, choosing instead to conclude that 
the district court applied an insufficiently demanding standard when 
it found a less than 2% deviation unconstitutional.58 
Eighteen years later, the Supreme Court again examined partisan 
motivations in redistricting in Vieth v. Jubelirer.59 There the Court 
examined a map put in place by Pennsylvania Republicans “as a 
punitive measure against Democrats for having enacted pro-
Democrat redistricting plans elsewhere.”60 The Supreme Court 
affirmed a dismissal of the claim against the map in a 5-4 decision but 
had only four votes in favor of overruling Davis v. Bandemer.61 Justice 
Kennedy concurred in the judgement, noting that partisan 
gerrymandering claims face two obstacles: “the lack of comprehensive 
and neutral principles for drawing electoral boundaries” and “the 
absence of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention.”62 Despite 
his inability to find an acceptable standard, Justice Kennedy did not 
join the rest of the majority in overturning Davis because the 
arguments were “not so compelling as that they require us now to bar 
all future claims of injury from a partisan gerrymander.”63 
In the wake of Kennedy’s concurrence, the Supreme Court did not 
take up the question of partisan redistricting again until Harris. 
Despite its silence on the issue the Court did find “an intentional 
effort to allow incumbent Democrats to maintain or increase their 
 
 55.  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 56.  Id. at 115. 
 57.  Id. at 126–27. 
 58.  Id. at 113–14. 
 59.  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 60.  Id. at 272. 
 61.  Id. at 270–71. 
 62.  Id. at 306–07 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 63.  Id. at 309. 
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delegation” based on the new legislative map.64 Given the Court’s 
previous symmetrical reasoning between racial and political 
gerrymandering,65 it could also draw on recent jurisprudence in the 
racial gerrymandering context. The Court recently held in Alabama 
Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama66 that the equal population goal 
is the background of redistricting, “taken as a given, when 
determining whether race, or other factors, predominate.”67 Given this 
statement of law, it seems likely that the Court will move in a similar 
way in its analysis of partisan redistricting if it finds the case at hand 
justiciable. 
B.  Section 5 Preclearance as a Goal of Redistricting 
Prior to Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court consistently 
held that general compliance with the Voting Rights Act was a 
legitimate reason for population deviations in the redistricting 
process.68 Although the Court has never specifically addressed 
whether or not the goal of obtaining preclearance from the 
Department of Justice through Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is 
also a legitimate reason for deviations, in LULAC v. Perry,69 eight 
justices found obtaining preclearance to be a “compelling state 
interest.”70 
Despite this strong backing, the Court’s decision in Shelby County 
drastically altered the voting rights landscape.71 Although it struck 
down the coverage formula section of the act rather than the 
preclearance section,72 the Court seemed to suggest that the reasoning 
behind the Voting Rights Act itself and subsequent judicial decisions 
relying on that reasoning are no longer valid because the Voting 
 
 64.  Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 947 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 65.  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125–26 (1986). 
 66.  Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015). 
 67.  Id. at 1270. 
 68.  See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 
(1996). 
 69.  League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
 70.  Id. at 518 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined in 
relevant part by Roberts, C.J., Thomas & Alito, JJ.); id. at 475 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, joined in relevant part by Breyer, J.); id. at 485 n.2 (Souter, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Ginsburg, J.). 
 71.  See Guy-Uriel Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rowher, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The 
Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 1391 (2015) (“Shelby Cty. marks the death of 
the VRA as a superstatute.”). 
 72.  Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2015). 
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Rights Act itself is no longer necessary.73 However, the Court has not 
addressed any question regarding the constitutionality of Section 5 
since Shelby County, and it explicitly chose not to rule Section 5 
unconstitutional at the time.74 
III.  HOLDING 
A.  Partisan Redistricting 
The three-judge panel began its opinion under the assumption 
that partisanship was not a legitimate reason for population deviation 
in redistricting.75 The panel found that the primary factor behind 
population deviation between the districts was AIRC’s attempt to 
comply with the Voting Rights Act and receive preclearance from the 
Department of Justice.76 Moreover, the court found that the maximum 
population deviation was less than 10%, leaving the plaintiffs with the 
burden to prove a prima facie case.77 
The panel also noted that, in this case, it was especially difficult to 
separate legitimate reasons for deviations from illegitimate ones.78 In 
Arizona, the legitimate rationale of increasing minority ability-to-
elect districts paralleled the (assumed) illegitimate rationale of 
increasing the prospects of electing Democratic candidates.79 
Ultimately, the bipartisan support from the Commissioners for the 
changes leading to the population deviations “undermine[d] the 
notion that partisanship, rather than compliance with the Voting 
Rights Act, was what motivated those deviations.”80 
B.  Section 5 Preclearance as a Goal of Redistricting 
The panel concluded that “compliance with the Voting Rights Act 
is among the legitimate redistricting criteria that can justify minor 
population deviations.”81 The panel first relied on the Supreme 
 
 73.  Charles & Fuentes-Rowhar, supra note 71, at 1421–22. 
 74.  See Shelby Cty., Ala.  v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2015) (“We issue no holding on 
§ 5. . . .”). 
 75.  Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1047 (D. Ariz. 
2014) (per curiam). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 1060. 
 78.  Id. at 1061. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 1073. 
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Court’s decision in Bush v. Vera, noting that if compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act were not a legitimate state policy, “we doubt that 
the Court would have assumed in Vera that it is a compelling state 
interest.”82 The three-judge panel rejected Appellants’ argument that 
the Voting Rights Act cannot serve as such an interest because the 
text of the Act does not explicitly allow population deviations.83 
The panel also held that its decision was not altered by the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder.84 Shelby County 
did not control because it pertained to the coverage formula for 
preclearance rather than to preclearance itself.85 Although the 
decision in Shelby County may have rendered preclearance as a 
requirement inapplicable, it did not hold that Section 5 itself was 
unconstitutional.86 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Harris’s Arguments 
Harris argues that the panel found two reasons for the population 
deviations in AIRC’s final map: partisan benefits on behalf of the 
Democratic Party and preclearance approval from the Department of 
Justice.87 He contends that neither of these reasons “justifies deviating 
from this Court’s one-person, one-vote principle.”88 Harris also relies 
on the Supreme Court’s summary affirmance in Larios v. Cox to show 
that population deviations of less than 10% still require justification 
in the first place.89 
Harris first argues that AIRC’s final map contained population 
deviations due to partisanship and that such a goal does not justify 
deviating from the Equal Protection Clause’s one-person, one-vote 
standard.90 According to Harris, the three-judge panel was correct in 
its assumption that unequally apportioning a legislature in order to 
gain a partisan advantage is an illegitimate reason for population 
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 1074. 
 84.  Id. at 1075. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Brief for Appellants, supra note 47, at 21. 
 88.  Id. at 22. 
 89.  Id. at 50. 
 90.  Id. at 22. 
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deviations.91 However, the panel failed to properly understand how 
much influence partisanship had on the final map for Arizona’s 
apportionment.92 Partisanship was actually the only possibly 
legitimate reason for the population deviations because seeking 
preclearance from the Department of Justice is no longer a valid 
reason for deviating from the one-person, one-vote standard after 
Shelby County v. Holder.93 
Harris next argues that the Voting Rights Act never required 
states to make districts of unequal population,94 but even if it had in 
the past, Shelby County eliminated that justification.95 The benchmark 
map for Arizona from 2000 had seven ability-to-elect districts.96 
Although creating fewer than seven ability-to-elect districts in the 
current map would have triggered retrogression and prevented the 
map from getting preclearance, Harris claims that nothing in the 
Voting Rights Act required AIRC to create three additional ability-
to-elect districts.97 “The Department of Justice has never required 
unequal population for preclearance in the 48 years of administering 
Section 5.”98 Further, “[t]he Justice Department’s own manual states 
preventing retrogression under Section 5 does not require 
jurisdictions to violate the one-person, one-vote principle.”99 
Even if creating additional ability-to-elect districts at one point 
justified deviations from the one-person, one-vote principle, Harris 
argues that in the wake of Shelby County such justifications are 
void.100 He contends that even though the map was drawn before 
Shelby County, its holding still applies, just as any school segregated 
under Plessy v. Ferguson would not be exempt from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.101 Instead, Harris 
 
 91.  Id. at 24. 
 92.  See id. at 28 (“The only issue that divided the three judges was whether obtaining a 
partisan advantage was the ‘predominant’ motive (Judge Clifton) or the ‘actual and sole’ motive 
(Judge Silver)”) (citing Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1072 
n.10, 1085 (D. Ariz. 2014) (per curiam)). 
 93.  Id. at 48–49. 
 94.  Id. at 41. 
 95.  Id. at 46. 
 96.  Id. at 41. 
 97.  Id. at 41–42. 
 98.  Id. at 43 (quoting Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 
1103  (D. Ariz. 2015) (Wake, J., dissenting)). 
 99.  Id. (quoting Justice Department Guidance Concerning Redistricting under Section 
5, 76 Fed. Reg. 7470, 7472 (Feb. 9, 2011)) (emphasis added). 
 100.  Id. at 46. 
 101.  Id. 
BELLIS FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2016  10:50 AM 
188 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 11 
argues the Court should invalidate any justification based on 
preclearance because it is unconstitutional to apply Section 5 
anywhere.102 
B.  AIRC’s Arguments 
AIRC advances two core arguments: first, the population 
deviations at issue fall within the permissible range of 10% and do not 
require justification without Harris establishing a prima facie case;103 
and second, even if justifications were required, the district court 
correctly found that the deviations between districts in the final map 
were justified.104 
AIRC’s first argument relies on a lack of precedent for its 
rejoinder.105 The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that states do not 
have to adhere to perfect equality when constructing state legislative 
districts.106 Further, “the Supreme Court has never held that a state 
must justify population deviations of less than 10% in a state 
legislative redistricting plan,”107 because minor population deviations 
among districts do not substantially dilute the strength of individual 
votes to the point that those voters are deprived of fair and effective 
representation.108 Perfect mathematical precision is impossible, so the 
burden remains on the plaintiff in cases where deviations are less than 
10%.109 
AIRC also distinguishes Larios v. Cox, Harris’s primary case for 
requiring justifications from states for deviations less than 10%.110 
AIRC argues that, unlike the Commissioners here, in Larios the 
Georgia legislature gave no good faith effort towards legitimate goals 
 
 102.  See id. at 47 (“To allow the current map to govern successive elections cycles until 2020 
would give continuing force to Section 5 despite the unconstitutionality of applying it 
anywhere.”) (quoting Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1100 
(D. Ariz. 2014) (Wake, J., dissenting)). 
 103.  Brief of Appellee at 28, Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’m, No. 14-232 (U.S. 
Sept. 4, 2015). 
 104.  Id. at 37. 
 105.  See id. at 29 (noting that the Supreme Court has never held that a prima facie case 
exists with less than 10% population deviation). 
 106.  Id. at 29–30 (citing Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S.Ct. 1257, 1262–63 
(2015); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 417–18 (1977); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321–22 
(1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964)). 
 107.  Id. at 29. 
 108.  Id. at 30 (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973)). 
 109.  Id. at 33–34. 
 110.  Id. at 34. 
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in its redistricting process.111 Additionally, AIRC notes that the Larios 
decision was a summary affirmance and argues that the Supreme 
Court does not “make new law in a summary affirmance like 
Larios.”112 
AIRC’s second argument relies on the three-judge panel’s finding 
that the primary reason for any population deviations was the 
legitimate goal of achieving preclearance from the Department of 
Justice.113 AIRC notes first that this is a factual finding and thus “is 
entitled to deference and reviewed only for clear error.”114 This 
deference is due to the panel’s close proximity to the facts of the case 
and the ability to best judge the credibility of witnesses.115 As a result, 
the only option with de novo review available to Harris is to argue 
that as a matter of law, preclearance itself is not a legitimate rationale 
for deviations in the redistricting process.116 
In response to Harris’s arguments on this point, AIRC first points 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in LULAC v. Perry, where eight 
justices endorsed the idea that compliance with Section 5 is a 
compelling state interest, “and thus necessarily a rational one.”117 
AIRC further notes that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
compliance with the Voting Rights Act generally is a rational state 
interest.118 Finally, AIRC observes that while the Voting Rights Act 
did not require Arizona to have unequally populated districts, it did 
require Arizona to seek preclearance from the Department of Justice, 
which drove AIRC to create ten ability-to-elect districts in the first 
place.119 
In response to Harris’s final argument, AIRC claims that 
“[r]elying on Shelby County to invalidate Arizona’s election map 
would be perverse.”120 Shelby County invalidated the coverage 
formula of the Voting Rights Act because “it imposed unjustified 
 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 38. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 41. 
 117.  Id. at 42–43 (citing LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 518 (2006) ((Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 475 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); id. at 485 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 118.  Id. at 43 (citing Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 
977 (1996)). 
 119.  Id. at 45. 
 120.  Id. at 53. 
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burdens on the residual sovereignty of the States over their elections 
by subjecting them to federal oversight.”121 AIRC argues that here, 
Arizona, through its agent AIRC, chose to prioritize preclearance in 
order to further its own sovereignty by “keeping the final decision on 
its map out of the hands of the federal courts.”122 Moreover, AIRC 
contends that the decision in Shelby County invalidated the coverage 
formula under Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, not Section 5 as 
Harris argues.123 Finally, AIRC argues that Shelby County’s controlling 
statement of law on the coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act is 
immaterial to the governing substantive law in this case.124 AIRC 
claims that at most, the law requires that minor deviations in 
populations between districts be “based on legitimate considerations 
incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy.”125 Thus, as long 
as Arizona was required to seek preclearance when it created the 
map, AIRC acted legitimately in implementing a rational state 
policy.126 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Court should find in favor of AIRC. Although the Court 
should hold that neither partisanship nor the desire to obtain 
preclearance from the Department of Justice can justify the creation 
of legislative districts which deviate from the Equal Protection 
Clause’s one-person, one-vote standard, the Court should ultimately 
find that the deviations in Arizona’s map are minor and that as a 
result, Harris has not satisfied the clear error burden required to 
overturn the lower court’s finding that he failed to establish a prima 
facie case. 
A.  Renault’s Valor: Discretion in the Contemplation of Partisan 
Redistricting 
Captain Renault: My dear Ricky, you overestimate the influence of 
the Gestapo. I don’t interfere with them and they don’t interfere 
with me. In Casablanca I am master of my fate! I am . . . 
Police Officer: Major Strasser [of the Gestapo] is here, sir! 
 
 121.  Id. (quoting Shelby Cty., Ala.  v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2015)). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 51–52. 
 124.  Id. at 52. 
 125.  Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964)). 
 126.  Id. at 53. 
BELLIS FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2016  10:50 AM 
2016] RELUCTANT JURISPRUDENCE ON PARTISANSHIP IN REDISTRICTING 191 
Rick: You were saying?  
Captain Renault: Excuse me.127 
Like Captain Renault’s rebellion against his Nazi commanders, 
the Supreme Court’s holdings on partisan redistricting have often 
exercised discretion as the better part of their valor. Although the 
Court has recognized that partisan influences on redistricting can be 
problematic,128 it has refused to set standards that would give the 
courts undue influence in politics.129 However, the Court’s reticence in 
this field has come solely in political gerrymandering cases as opposed 
to population deviation cases.130 This makes sense given the Court’s 
more exacting scrutiny in population deviation cases. As a result, the 
Court should be willing to set a clear standard for partisan 
justifications in population deviation cases. 
Nonetheless, it is unlikely the Court will decide to do so here. 
Instead, the Court will likely follow Davis v. Bandemer, its first 
political gerrymandering case. The Court will probably condemn 
partisan influence on apportionment but fail to find a justiciable 
standard for such cases. Like Captain Renault in the scene above, the 
Court may trumpet its beliefs loudly but will likely fail to act on them 
in a meaningful way. 
B.  Renault’s Wager: Compromising on Invalidation of the 
Preclearance Justification 
Captain Renault: This is the end of the chase.  
Rick: Twenty thousand francs says it isn’t.  
Captain Renault: Is that a serious offer?  
Rick: I just paid out twenty. I’d like to get it back.  
Captain Renault: Make it ten. I’m only a poor corrupt official.131 
Although some justices on the Court might wish to retroactively 
disallow all use of preclearance justifications for population 
deviations, the Court should ultimately only disallow such 
 
 127.  CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942). 
 128.  See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting most Justices 
believed partisanship “is a traditional criterion, and a constitutional one, so long as it does not 
go too far”). 
 129.  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306–07 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“[C]ourts . . . would risk assuming political, not legal, responsibility for a process that often 
produces ill will and distrust.”). 
 130.  Adam Raviv, Unsafe Harbors: One Person, One Vote and Partisan Redistricting, 7 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1003 (2005). 
 131.  CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942). 
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justifications going forward due to the excessive collateral 
consequences of retroactive application. Some justices would surely 
like to go further.132 
The ramifications of retroactively invalidating the seeking of 
preclearance from the Department of Justice as a justification are 
simply too great for the Supreme Court to allow.133 After the last 
redistricting cycle, nine states and parts of seven more were covered 
under the coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act.134 “During the 
2010 Census redistricting cycle, the Department of Justice alone made 
a preclearance determination of 37 statewide redistricting plans in 11 
States.”135 This does not include those states and counties that sought 
preclearance from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
instead of the Department of Justice.136 A reversal of the lower court’s 
decision would call into question the validity of each and every one of 
those plans, especially if they relied primarily on preclearance as a 
justification even if no partisan motivations were found.137 Ultimately, 
the Court should exercise the same discretion it used in not recklessly 
wading into the question of partisan motivations for gerrymandering 
and decline to include retroactive application in its decision to 
invalidate preclearance as a justification for population deviations. 
C.  Renault’s Bill: The Appellant’s Burden and the Prima Facie Case 
Captain Renault: Oh no, Emil, please. A bottle of your best 
champagne, and put it on my bill.  
Emil: Very well, sir.  
Victor Laszlo: Captain, please . . .  
Captain Renault: Oh, please, monsieur. It is a little game we play. 
They put it on the bill, I tear up the bill. It is very convenient.138  
Although the Court is likely to rule in favor of Harris (or tie, given 
the current composition of the Court) on both of the substantive 
questions, it should ultimately affirm the lower court’s judgment. The 
Court has yet to determine whether or not partisanship and 
 
 132.  See Shelby Cty., Ala.  v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612,  2631 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“I would find § 5 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as well.”). 
 133.  See Brief of Former Officials of the U.S. Department of Justice Who Enforced the 
Voting Rights Act as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 9, Harris v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, No. 14-232 (U.S. Nov. 2,  2015) [hereinafter Brief of Former Officials]. 
 134.  Id. at 24. 
 135.  Id. at 25. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 27. 
 138.  CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942). 
BELLIS FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2016  10:50 AM 
2016] RELUCTANT JURISPRUDENCE ON PARTISANSHIP IN REDISTRICTING 193 
preclearance are permissible justifications for population deviation, 
but it has spoken on when the state has the burden of showing such 
justifications in the first place. “Our decisions have established, as a 
general matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum 
population deviation under 10% falls within this category of minor 
deviations.”139 Here, the maximum population deviation of 8.8% 
clearly falls into the minor deviations category. As a result, no prima 
facie case is established by the deviations alone and Harris failed to 
establish one at trial by proving that illegitimate justifications 
predominated over legitimate ones when the map was made. The 
lower court’s predomination standard for illegitimate criteria tracks 
the Supreme Court’s analysis in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. 
Alabama of racial gerrymandering justifications. If the Supreme 
Court seeks to create consistency on justifications for both racial and 
political claims and it declines to risk thousands of potential 
redistricting maps by retroactively removing preclearance as a valid 
justification, then it must affirm the lower court’s judgement. 
Moreover, the Court, through Justice Kennedy, has repeatedly 
shown a reticence to drastically shift the jurisprudence for 
redistricting questions.140 Although Justice Kennedy also appeared to 
provide the “swing” vote in the drastic Shelby County decision, his 
decisions in the voting rights context are clearly distinguishable from 
his decisions in the redistricting context.141 As a result, it is likely that 
he will continue to exercise his cautious approach to redistricting 
questions and join the Court’s affirmance of the lower court’s 
judgement. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court may have done its best to avoid entering the political 
fray of the redistricting process but it will be unable to maintain that 
evasion here. Like Rick the moment Ilsa walked into Sam’s, the 
wheels have been set in motion and there is no going back. This will 
be the Supreme Court’s first case on partisan redistricting in over a 
decade and its second analysis related to the Voting Rights Act since 
 
 139.  Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (2014). 
 140.  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306–07 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 141.  See Dale Ho, Two F’s for Formalism: Interpreting Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 
Light of Changing Demographics and Electoral Patterns, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 403, 417 
(2015) (examining the formalistic analysis of Kennedy’s plurality opinion in a vote dilution 
case). 
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Shelby County. Moreover, the Court should keep in mind the 
potentially momentous effects its decision could have on other 
redistricting plans.142 As a result, the Court should affirm the lower 
court’s judgment, and compromise on the question of preclearance, 
without bringing much additional clarity to its partisanship analysis in 
its redistricting doctrine. 
 
 
 142.  See Brief of Former Officials, supra note 133, at 9. 
